While New Keynesian models label money redundant in shaping business cycle, monetary aggregates are found relevant in predicting output, prices and interest rates or correctly identifying monetary policy shocks. This paper provides new evidence of money non redundancy in Euro area business cycle, contrary to most of recent literature. We study the dynamic effects of liquidity shocks under different traditional identifying methods, assessing their relevance compared to other sources of fluctuations. To shed some lights on money's role we propose to adopt an agnostic approach on the effects of liquidity shocks, thus letting data answer. Results show that shocks to monetary aggregates raise output, prices and policy rate, having a permanent effect on the latter. Hence, (i) money can not be omitted in modeling economic structure; (ii) liquidity is a powerful transmission in the short run, even more effective than interest rate channel. Our findings point to a reexamination of theoretical models and seem to support the emphasis given by European Central Bank (ECB) to the monetary pillar.
Extended abstract
This paper analyzes money's role in the Euro Area (EMU) business cycle using Vector Autoregressions (VAR). Whether money plays a structural role or it is just -at its maximum -an indicator variable is an open issue in current macroeconomics, the answer having clearly very different implications for economic analysis and implementing policy. 1 The key point highlighted by literature 3 All these papers construct a DSGE model in which a microfounded money demand is derived allowing for non separability between consumption and real balances in the households utility function, and then perform a state-space representation with estimation computed by Kalman Filter Maximum Likelihood: Favara and Giordani (2009) show some serious pitfalls of this method in capturing the real balances effect.
the interest rate channel. Furthermore, Svensson (2003) clearly states it is apparent that there is not much of a role for money in the transmission mechanism, whereas its potential most useful function is the one of an useful indicator which contains information about the state of the economy. 4 Lippi and Neri (2007), in an estimated structural DSGE model of the Euro Area, show that no useful information role emerges for monetary aggregates. However, many empirical papers raise doubts or counterintuitive arguments on this result, either stating a role for monetary aggregates in identifying monetary policy shocks either emphasizing their forecasting properties for output, prices and interest rates. Leeper and Roush (2003) recommend to "put money back in monetary policy models", as a consequence of the fact that the way of modelling money significantly affects output and inflation, while Poilly (2007) stresses the importance of the way money is introduced in the identification scheme, finding it non neutral in estimating DSGE models. As for the second strand of literature, Hafer, Haslag and Jones (2007) show that M1 and M2 can not be omitted for US economy in the (backwardlooking) IS curve such as in Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) , even once taken into account output-gap own lags and real interest rate ones, so that money helps for predicting economic activity and prices. In a complementary work Hafer and Jones (2008) present international evidence of the predictive power of money growth on GDP gap; thus, they suggest that money, independently of real interest rate, generally exerts a significant impact on the output-gap. Andres, Lopez-Salido and Nelson (2009) show that money demand has a forward-looking nature and that it is a key element in anticipating future variations of natural interest rate. Finally, Favara and Giordani (2009) find that money directly influences the triplet output, prices and interest rate, therefore recommending to reconsider money's role in macroeconomic models: specifically, they argue that shocks to broad monetary aggregates have substantial and persistent effects on output, prices and interest rates, which is completely at odds with the theoretical prediction of flat impulse response functions implied by NEK model. This paper analyzes money's role in the Euro Area, trying to shed some new light on the debate between the two opposite paradigms, the one stating money redundancy and the other finding money relevant in describing business cycle. If possible, assessing money's role is even more crucial for EMU economy because of the ECB two pillars monetary policy strategy. Given the aim of the paper, it's quite natural using a multivariate environment, in which a monetary aggregate augments the standard three-equations model. Furthermore, policy reasons related to the 2008 financial crisis make the question relevant: the massive liquidity injection performed by ECB and FED; the proper analysis of monetary transmission channels in a zero lower bound interest rate environment; possible consequences and implications for the exit strategy and the design of a new monetary strategy. We first show that, contrary to the conventional wisdom of money redundancy, liquidity shocks account for a relevant change in dynamic response of Euro Area output, inflation and interest rate in a traditional framework validating analogous results obtained by Favara and Giordani (2009) on US data. A one standard deviation liquidity shock is responsible for raising output of almost 0.3 points: the effect seems to be quite persistent, vanishing only after 11 quarters. Prices go up after 4 quarters to a peak of 0.8 points, while the policy rate is raised to a maximum of 50 basis points after almost 9 quarters, before starting slowly decline. Interestingly, this last response to a liquidity shock seems suggesting the presence of a monetary pillar in the ECB reaction function. Furthermore, variance decompositions show that money explains up to a 20% of output volatility, while accounting for 35% of prices and short-term rate. All these findings seem consistent with the long-run linkage between money and prices.
However, our main contribution stems from extending Favara and Giordani (2009) results from a three-ways perspective. First, we allow for simultaneity between monetary aggregates and interest rate, which is denied in the Choleski identification with money ordered last. Second, we move to a full identification context, in order to compare the importance of liquidity shocks to other sources of business cycle, thus recovering also a supply shock, a demand shock, a monetary policy shock. Second, we achieve identification by means of sign restrictions (Uhlig, 2005 An expansionary supply shock is defined as a shock having a positive effect on output (and money demand) and a negative impact on prices; an expansionary demand shock is defined as a shock raising output and prices; an expansionary monetary policy shock is a demand shock having the further requisite of a negative effect on the policy rate; finally, consistently with the agnostic point of view, an expansionary liquidity shock is supposed only have a positive effect on liquidity, while leaving unrestricted all other responses.
Finally, as for robustness checking, we naturally derive the identifying restrictions from the theoretical model in ALSV (2006), allowing not only for a Taylor rule augmented by the monetary aggregate, but for a two pillars Phillips curve too (Gerlach, 2004 ), so to be as consistent as possible with the theoretical framework which ECB had in mind when two pillars strategy was designed. A number of results is illustrated. First, money can not be omitted in modeling economic structure because it significantly and persistently affects output, prices and interest rates, as showed by impulse response functions. Second, liquidity is a powerful channel of monetary transmission in the short run, even more effective than policy rate in affecting output. Third, liquidity shocks explain a small share of short-term inflation volatility, while their role becomes more relevant in the long-run. Fourth, consistently with the former point, policy rate setting is affected by liquidity shocks at a longer horizon. Last, our findings call for a reexamination of NEK models and seem to support the emphasis given by ECB to the monetary pillar: but this is left to further research.
